Cases for teaching research ethics

In this section of their guide to research ethics Mark Israel and Iain Hay (Flinders University, Australia) present three cases which can be used to teach research ethics – see the teaching research ethics section for how to use them.

Case 1: Students faked survey

In 2004 Scott Peterson was charged with murdering his pregnant wife and unborn son. Prosecutors in California sought the death penalty.

An Associated Press story claimed that the trial was moved by the judge from Modesto partly as a result of a survey conducted by 65 students from California State University. The survey apparently revealed that jurors without bias were more likely to be found in the San Francisco Bay area or Southern California than in Stanislaus County, the area which includes Modesto. Several students involved in the survey told the local newspaper that they had faked some of the survey returns because they had found it too difficult to run the survey properly.

To prompt discussion

1. The students who fabricated the data explained that they couldn’t afford to spend money on the telephone interviews required to undertake the survey. What would you have done in that situation?
2. If you knew that other students had fabricated data, would you have informed the professor at the time? What would you have done if you knew that someone else’s fabricated data was subsequently used as the basis to move a murder trial? Would you behave differently if you had been responsible for the fabrication?

Case 2: Harm and benefit in a licensed maternity home

Weinberg (2002) investigated the use of a particular planning document by a maternity home that helped young single mothers in Ontario, Canada. Use of this document was a mandatory requirement for homes licensed under provincial legislation, however Weinberg found that, although the executive director believed the home was complying with regulations, front line staff had bypassed the legislative requirements. At the request of the research participants, the researcher had agreed to provide some benefit to residents by naming those who had helped her with her work. However, if she allowed the licensing authority to identify the home, it might lose its funding. Weinberg was reluctant to harm an institution that, for all its faults, “ultimately supported and protected the very young women whom I was concerned about serving” (p91)”.

Weinberg M (2002) ‘Biting the hand that feeds you, and other feminist dilemmas in fieldwork’ in W van den Hoonaard (ed) Walking the tightrope: ethical issues for qualitative researchers Toronto: University of Toronto Press

To prompt discussion

1. How serious is the potential harm? How important is it to keep your promise to participants? Which would take priority? Why?
2. How did you reach your decision?

Case 3: Regulation of the night time economy

(The following case study was first published in Research ethics for social scientists: between ethical conduct and regulatory compliance (Israel & Hay, 2006), and is reproduced here by permission of Sage Publications and each of the commentators.)

We devised three scenarios and invited concise comment from social scientists and ethicists from a range of jurisdictions and disciplines. Our requirement for brevity compelled them to focus on key matters as they saw them – they did not have the opportunity to set out methodically the ways they approached the problem(s), although they did have time to reflect on the circumstances of each case.

The scenario

While observing and taking notes on behaviour outside a nightclub you see bouncers fighting with two young men.

1. Would you intervene?
2. Would you report the incident to anyone?
3. What would you do with your notes?
4. The young men sue the nightclub for assault. If their lawyers asked to see your notes, would you hand them over?
5. If you were called to testify in court, would you do so?
6. Would it make any difference if:
   • You were studying private security companies, undertaking research with the consent of the bouncers?
   • Your research was funded by the security company that employed the bouncers?
   • You were studying youth culture and undertaking research with the consent of the young men?

The commentators:

• John Lowman and Ted Palys, both Professor, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, Canada
• Monique Marks, Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
• Dick Hobbs, Professor of Sociology, London School of Economics, UK

Researchers are normally expected to minimise risks of harm or discomfort to participants in research projects. In some circumstances they may also be expected to promote the well being of participants or maximise the benefits to society as a whole. Beauchamp & Childress (2001) suggested that researchers might have to act if they knew that they could prevent significant harm to others, if they could do so without significantly hurting themselves. In some circumstances, they suggested researchers might be expected to owe a duty of beneficence to people even if they are not directly affected by his or her research programme. This case study raises questions about when researchers might feel that they had an obligation to protect the subjects of their research and what they might do when confronted with illegal behaviour.

Researchers who investigate violence might expect to witness violence. Indeed, that may be the very point of choosing a particular kind of methodology. One way of interpreting this case is to see it as an observation of public behaviour. In such circumstances most researchers seek to be as unobtrusive as possible, and, consequently prefer not to obtain informed consent to view the behaviour. As a result they may feel that they owe very little to the people that they are observing, certainly no more than they would owe as a passer-by:

If I am standing outside a nightclub it is likely that the potential for violence in the context of the night time economy will be one of my sociological interests. Therefore to intervene would be counterproductive, as violence is very much part of the phenomena I am attempting to understand. But violence is an emotive, and at times, especially for men, quite seductive activity. Consequently intervention, for instance if one of the combatants is a friend or relation, is not entirely impossible. I can only imagine intervening if I had some kind of personal relationship with one or more of the combatants, and certainly not on behalf of social justice or fairness. While conducting research I have intervened in violent situations in the past, but only when I felt some personal rather than professional commitment to an individual. As an afterthought, why get involved in a violent dispute with bouncers – it is dangerous

— Dick Hobbs

All commentators were wary of intervening for fear of altering the very behaviour they were studying. What this meant in practice varied. While Dick Hobbs decided that he would not report the incident to anyone on the basis that “reporting the incident would negate any further effectiveness in the field”, Lowman & Palys suggested that they would probably call an ambulance if someone were seriously injured.

On the other hand, one researcher who had studied police violence suggested that she might attempt to intervene:

The dilemma appears to be less ethical in nature and more about personal safety. If I established that the two young men were being seriously harmed in this incident, I would intervene, particularly if nobody in the vicinity was offering to intervene…how much of an impact my interventions would have, given that I am a relatively small woman, is another issue altogether.

— Monique Marks

Marks wrote that she would also probably report the incident to the club.

Several social scientists have come under various legal, economic, political, social and physical pressures to reveal information that they have obtained during research. Some have gone to considerable lengths to protect their data. In this vein, Dick Hobbs decided that he would resist all attempts to look at his notes, arguing that his field notes “are designed for prospective academic analysis only”. On the other hand, both Lowman & Palys and Marks were willing to hand over those parts of their notes dealing with the incident to lawyers. Lowman & Palys argued: “We are observers in a public setting who made no confidentiality pledge to any of the participants”.

Marks was reluctant to testify, “as this would elevate the profile of the research work, perhaps making it more difficult to carry out in similar sites at a later date”. However, “if the two young men were seriously injured, I would be more inclined to testify in order to avoid similar incidents occurring again”.

For Lowman & Palys, the crucial question was not who paid for the research but whether the researchers had entered private space and were conducting research with the consent of the research participants:

Because of potential risks created by their participation in the research, we would promise to keep participants’ names confidential and not release information that could identify them. We would use pseudonyms in our notes, and keep the notes in a locked filing cabinet. We would refuse to divulge confidential information to a court, except if the relevant research participants authorise us to do so”.

— Lowman & Palys

If working with the consent of the bouncers, Marks would “worry about compromising the terms of the agreement with the bouncers. I would need to think very carefully about reporting the incident to the club and how this would affect prospects for future research and the impact it may have on individual bouncers. I would be more cautious about publicising information”. If working with the consent of the young men, she would “feel far more aligned to the interests of the young men involved and would be more willing to report the incident to club managers. I would still feel uncomfortable about handing over incriminating fieldnotes and giving evidence”.

Hobbs also believed that the source of funding would have little effect on his decision making, although he appreciated that this stance might be a luxury for other researchers:

The source of funding for the project would make no difference to my stance. But this is an easy option for me as I am well established and could easily walk away from a project if I felt that the funder was imposing some undue influence on the project.

— Dick Hobbs

Interestingly, both Hobbs and Marks were highly critical of attempts to direct researchers’ responses to ethical dilemmas. Hobbs argued that:

Ethnographic work is highly personal. Professional bodies who attempt to regulate the activities of researchers working in highly volatile environments come across as naïve and pompous, spouting bland liberal platitudes rather than informing and supporting researchers. For most of us our everyday ethical decisions are not governed by formal codes. Decisions emerge situationally as part of the ongoing process of accruing cultural capital. It would be arrogant to expect academic labour to be any different.

— Dick Hobbs

Similarly, Marks asserted that:

I am somewhat cautious in writing down my responses to ‘in the field’ dilemmas since in many ways our responses to them cannot be determined outside of the field. The answers to these questions and the actions I would take would be more directed by in the moment circumstances, established relationships and the exact nature of the incident, than they would by a priori established principles. For example, while the confidentiality of participants who have given consent (such as bouncers) is always a key consideration, should their actions compromise the safety of vulnerable groupings (like young people), I may feel compelled to alert authorities to their conduct. On the other hand, if I felt that authorities were unlikely to take any positive action, it may make more sense to publish my observations in accessible publications or media while being careful to conceal any identifying information. If, however, I had established frank relationships with participants, I may directly communicate my observations directly to them. I would have to carefully weigh up the ‘good’ that publicising my observations would have, with the consequences this may have for the safety of all concerned. I would also need to think about what sort of publication would best achieve the kinds of social change I would like to see produced in the public/private regulation of security.

— Monique Marks

Last Modified: 4 June 2010